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 Over the past few years, customer relationship management and loyalty programs (LPs) have been 
widely adopted by companies and have received a great deal of attention from marketers, consultants, and, to a 
lesser degree, academics.  In this research, we examine the effect of the level of effort required to obtain a LP’s 
reward on consumers’ perception of the LP’s attractiveness.  We propose that, under certain conditions, 
increasing the program requirements can enhance consumers’ likelihood of joining the program, thus leading 
consumers to prefer a dominated option.  Specifically, we hypothesize that consumers often evaluate LPs based 
on their individual effort to obtain the reward relative to the relevant reference effort (e.g., the effort of typical 
other consumers).  When consumers believe they have an effort advantage relative to typical others (i.e., an 
idiosyncratic fit with the LP), higher program requirements magnify this perception of advantage and can 
therefore increase the overall perceived value of the program.  This proposition was supported in a series of 
studies in which the perceived idiosyncratic fit was manipulated either by reducing the individual effort or by 
raising the reference effort.  The findings also indicate that (a) idiosyncratic fit considerations are elicited 
spontaneously, (b) idiosyncratic fit mediates the effect of effort on consumer response to LPs, and (c) an 
alternative account for the results based on signaling is not supported.  We conclude that these findings are part 
of a broader phenomenon, which we term the idiosyncratic fit heuristic, whereby a key factor that affects 
consumers’ response to marketing programs and promotional offers is the perceived relative advantage or fit 
with the individual’s idiosyncratic conditions and preferences. 
 
 
 Over the past few years, loyalty (or frequency) programs have become a key component 
of customer relationship management (CRM), serving a critical role in developing relationships, 
stimulating product and service usage, and retaining customers.  Marketers have implemented 
such programs in a wide variety of industries (Blattberg and Deighton 1996; Deighton 2000; 
Drèze and Hoch 1998; Sausner 2001; Shoemaker and Lewis 1999), and over half of the 
American (adult) population currently participates in at least one loyalty program (LaPointe 
2002).  Further, the importance of loyalty programs has been recognized in the managerial and 
economic modeling literatures (e.g., Borenstein 1996; Kim, Shi, and Srinivasan 2001; Kopalle 
and Neslin 2000).  Nevertheless, we still know very little about the factors that influence 
customer perception of, and response to, such programs and why some programs are highly 
successful (e.g., frequent flyer programs) whereas other programs fail (e.g., Internet network 
loyalty programs).  Thus, one goal of the present research is to improve our understanding of 
consumer preference toward loyalty programs and, more generally, toward streams of efforts that 
lead to future rewards (e.g., conducting research to achieve tenure and dieting to lose weight). 
Loyalty programs (hereafter, LPs) also raise important theoretical questions relating to 
such issues as the characteristics of the required efforts, the obtained rewards, the decision to join 
the program, and the factors influencing the likelihood of reaching the reward.  Recent research 
has begun to address these questions, and in particular, the relationship between the required 
effort and the preference toward LP rewards.  For instance, Kivetz and Simonson (2002a) 
showed that consumers use the required program effort to justify their choices between luxury 
and necessity rewards, and Hsee, Yu, and Zhang (2002) demonstrated that a program’s currency 
(e.g., points or miles) can mask an undesirable effort-reward relationship.  Although this research 
has improved our understanding of the relation between the level of effort and consumers’ 
reward preferences (see also van Osselaer and Alba 2002), the more basic question of how the 
level of effort affects the attractiveness of a LP has not yet been studied. 
In this research, we investigate the effect of the level of required effort on customer 
preference for loyalty programs.  Contrary to the common assumption, we suggest that higher 
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 effort requirements can enhance the perceived value of loyalty programs.  Furthermore, we 
propose a general principle of consumer behavior, which we call the “idiosyncratic fit heuristic,” 
whereby consumers are enticed by offers in which they enjoy a relative advantage.  For example, 
when consumers perceive their own effort in complying with the program requirements as lower 
than the efforts of typical other consumers, they construe the LP as providing an idiosyncratic fit 
and, therefore, as a better deal for them.  Like other rules of thumb, the idiosyncratic fit heuristic 
is often useful and consistent with value maximization, but it can lead to errors and selections of 
inferior options.  In particular, we show that, under high perceived idiosyncratic fit, consumers 
may be more likely to join a LP with greater effort requirements than one that offers the same 
reward with lower effort. 
We begin by presenting the concept of idiosyncratic fit and discussing its role in shaping 
consumer preference and accounting for the results of prior research.  Next, we consider the 
implications of idiosyncratic fit for consumer response to LPs, leading to the idiosyncratic fit 
hypothesis.  This hypothesis as well as other predictions were tested in a series of studies, with a 
total of approximately 2300 consumers.  We also examined the mechanism underlying the 
impact of idiosyncratic fit as well as alternative explanations for the results.  The theoretical and 
practical implications of this research are discussed in the final section. 
 
THE ROLE OF IDIOSYNCRATIC FIT IN CONSUMER PREFERENCE 
 
A great deal of research has shown that consumer preferences are often unstable and ill-
defined, and that consumers construct their evaluations and preferences when faced with the 
need to make a decision (for a review, see Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998; Payne, Bettman, and 
Johnson 1992).  Other studies further demonstrated the difficulty of assessing individual options 
and outcomes (e.g., Bazerman, Loewenstein, and White 1992; Hsee 1996; Nowlis and Simonson 
1997).  Assessing the value of an individual option or a marketing offer is particularly 
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 challenging when consumers do not have readily available reference points, such as similar, 
previously encountered options or offers (e.g., Kahneman, Ritov, and Schkade 1999). 
How, then, do consumers handle the task of evaluating individual offers or options 
presented to them?  Prior research suggests that consumers seek cues that serve as proxies for the 
offer’s attractiveness or value for them.  For example, even if a consumer has no prior 
information about the normal or reasonable prices in a certain category, the fact that an item is on 
“sale” for 50% off the regular price can be used as a cue that the price is attractive (e.g., Thaler 
1985; Winer 1986). 
Relatedly, we argue that consumers often assess alternatives and marketing promotions 
based on their idiosyncratic fit with the offer; that is, they tend to place significant weight on 
whether the offer provides a better “fit” for them than for others.  If a consumer believes that she 
has an especially good fit with an alternative (e.g., she thinks that a certain aspect of the offer is 
especially valuable to her but not to others), and given the reasonable assumption that existing 
offers in the marketplace are perceived as attractive by most consumers, then the consumer may 
conclude that this alternative is particularly attractive for her.  In other words, idiosyncratic fit 
indicates that the consumer has a relative advantage with respect to that option, which is often, 
though not always, an indicator of an attractive opportunity (see also Schindler 1989, 1998; 
Thaler 1985, 1999). 
 The reliance on such an idiosyncratic fit heuristic is consistent with social comparison 
theory (Festinger 1954), which explicitly postulates a human drive to evaluate one’s abilities, 
outcomes, and preferences.  Since such evaluations often cannot be established on the basis of 
objective criteria, people may rely instead on comparisons with the typical abilities, outcomes, 
and preferences of others.  The notion that consumers will spontaneously compare themselves to 
typical others is also supported in research on mental simulations and counterfactuals (e.g., 
Kahneman and Miller 1986; Sanna 1996).  This research has shown that people often voluntarily 
form comparisons relative to various simulated or mental representations that do not exist in 
reality. 
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  The idiosyncratic fit heuristic can account for the results of prior research (e.g., 
Simonson, Carmon, and O’Curry 1994; Simonson, Nowlis, and Simonson 1993), whereby 
consumers avoid options simply because they fit others better or because they include features 
that the consumer can do without.  For example, the finding that a consumer tends to prefer 
[reject] options that are rejected [preferred] by other consumers for reasons that do not apply to 
that consumer (Simonson et al. 1993) can be interpreted as suggesting that consumers assess their 
idiosyncratic fit with options and offers based on whether the reasons employed by others for 
selecting or rejecting these options are relevant to them.  Next, we consider the implications of 
idiosyncratic fit for consumer response to LPs, leading to a series of direct tests of this heuristic. 
 
THE IMPACT OF PERCEIVED IDIOSYNCRATIC FIT ON PREFERENCE FOR 
LOYALTY PROGRAMS 
 
When evaluating the attractiveness of a LP there are two main components that 
consumers are likely to consider: the required effort and the rewards that can be earned (e.g., see 
also Drèze and Hoch 1998; Hsee et al. 2002; Kivetz and Simonson 2002a; Soman 1998).  In 
many cases, the required efforts are extended over time, and rewards are contingent on reaching 
a certain requirement level (e.g., the amount of required points, frequent flyer miles, or purchases 
before reward attainment).  Perceived (program) effort is defined here as any inconvenience 
inherent in complying with the program requirements, such as making a special effort to buy at a 
particular store or purchasing more than the consumer would have otherwise bought.1 
 Since most consumers do not have expertise in assessing the efforts and rewards 
associated with participating in a LP, they are likely to rely on cues, just as consumers use 
various quality and value cues.  In particular, we propose that consumers often determine the 
value of a program for them based on whether or not it provides a better fit for them than for 
                                              
1 Perceived effort also includes substitution costs, that is, the disutility that consumers incur by purchasing a 
particular brand that they would not have otherwise bought (Blattberg and Neslin 1990). 
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 others.  Thus, when consumers perceive their individual effort as low relative to a relevant 
reference effort (e.g., the effort of most other consumers), they may construe the program as 
providing them with an idiosyncratic fit.  Of course, consumers generally prefer larger absolute 
rewards and lower absolute efforts.  However, most loyalty programs cannot be easily compared 
with other programs, in part because marketers often make such comparisons difficult to perform; 
for instance, marketers offer different rewards or use different dollar-to-point conversion rates 
(e.g., “1 point for every $10 spent” versus “10 points for every $1 spent”).  Other programs are 
difficult to compare because they are structured very differently from each other; for instance, 
some hotel LPs denominate efforts in terms of required stays, whereas other programs use dollars 
spent.  Furthermore, evaluating the attractiveness of loyalty programs is not something in which 
most consumers have a great deal of expertise.  Consequently, making judgments about LPs on 
the basis of the absolute required effort and the obtained reward is often a challenging task. 
 Conversely, assessing idiosyncratic fit is often much easier.  Consider, for example, a gas 
station that offers a loyalty program, where consumers can earn a car vacuum cleaner after they 
make twenty gas purchases at the station.  A consumer who happens to live very close to this 
particular gas station and purchases gas at this station frequently is likely to recognize that 
his/her idiosyncratic effort in complying with the program requirements is lower than the typical 
effort of most other consumers who might participate in that program.  Such a consumer may 
then make the attribution that, if the program requirements and offerings are reasonable for 
others, they are especially favorable for him/her; that is, the consumer enjoys an idiosyncratic fit 
with respect to that program. 
 We argue that although considering idiosyncratic fit when evaluating LPs may often be a 
reasonable strategy, over-relying on this heuristic can lead to biases and sub-optimal decisions.  
In particular, consumers who rely heavily on the idiosyncratic fit heuristic may prefer a 
dominated LP that requires greater effort for the same reward.  That is, contrary to the common 
assumption, higher effort requirements can enhance the likelihood of joining a LP when 
consumers perceive themselves as having an idiosyncratic fit with this program. 
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  This prediction is illustrated in Figure 1.  The perceived reference effort (e.g., the effort 
required by typical others or the effort required by another related LP) and the perceived 
individual effort are both increasing functions of the objective (stated) program requirements.2  
The perception of idiosyncratic fit, which results from individuals construing their individual 
effort as lower than the reference effort, is represented using the vertical solid lines between the 
reference effort line and a (lower) individual effort line.  For example, in the left-hand side of 
Figure 1, a consumer with a relatively flat (low) individual effort function has an effort 
advantage relative to the (steeper) reference effort function.  This consumer perceives the LP as 
providing her with an idiosyncratic fit. 
 Moreover, in such a case, the perceived idiosyncratic fit (i.e., the gap between reference 
and individual effort) increases with greater program requirements.  For instance, if a consumer 
believes that it is easier for her to make ten gasoline purchases at a particular station (e.g., because 
she lives next to that station), then she will perceive her effort advantage as greater when twenty 
gasoline purchases are required instead of ten.  To use a more extreme example, if just one 
purchase is required to obtain the reward, then the significance of any idiosyncratic fit is limited, 
because any consumer can make a one-time effort.  However, as the level of program requirements 
increases, the relative advantage of the consumer with idiosyncratic fit “adds up.”  Considering 
that evaluating LPs on the basis of the absolute required effort is typically very difficult, this 
increase in the relative advantage can enhance the overall perceived value of the program. 
 By contrast, when the individual effort function is steeper (higher) than the reference 
effort function, the consumer will construe the program as providing an idiosyncratic misfit 
(represented with broken vertical lines).  This perception of misfit will increase with greater 
program requirements.  Thus, in this case, both the individual effort and the perceived 
idiosyncratic misfit will work in the same direction, whereby increasing the program 
requirements detracts from the program’s attractiveness. 
                                              
2  The ensuing conceptualization also holds (within a reasonable empirical range) when the perception of effort is 
assumed to be a concave function of program requirements (i.e., diminishing sensitivity to requirements). 
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 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Of course, idiosyncratic fit is not the only determinant of consumer response to LPs.  In 
particular, to the extent that a consumer can meaningfully and confidently assess the 
attractiveness of a LP on the basis of the absolute values of the required effort and the reward, 
the need to rely on a proxy such as idiosyncratic fit diminishes.  For instance, most frequent flyer 
programs are very similar and follow a de facto standard regarding the required effort and reward 
thresholds (e.g., 25,000 miles for a free roundtrip domestic ticket).  Thus, consumers may be able 
to evaluate frequent flyer programs without relying much on idiosyncratic fit. 
 However, considering the difficulty of comparing most LPs (see also Hsee 1996; Nowlis 
and Simonson 1997) and the fact that most consumers are not experts in valuing such programs, 
we expect the idiosyncratic fit heuristic to play a significant role in many situations.  
Specifically, when consumers perceive the reference effort as higher than their own individual 
effort (i.e., idiosyncratic fit), increasing the program requirements (between-subjects) is expected 
to lead to higher perceived program value, even though the reward is held constant (i.e., a 
violation of dominance).  Furthermore, even if the program requirements are held constant, the 
perceived idiosyncratic fit and, correspondingly, the LP attractiveness may be enhanced if the 
reference effort is raised. 
 These predictions, of course, do not mean that higher effort or reference effort will 
always enhance the attractiveness of the LP, considering that more effort has a direct negative 
effect on the program attractiveness (just as higher product price has a direct negative effect on 
the attractiveness of purchasing that product).  Moreover, at very high required effort levels, a 
consumer may eliminate the LP from further consideration before evaluating the implications of 
any idiosyncratic fit.  Finally, when consumers do not perceive the LP as providing an 
idiosyncratic fit (i.e., individual effort >= reference effort), greater requirements will lead to a 
lower perceived program value. 
The discussion leads to the following proposition: 
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  Under perceived idiosyncratic fit, increasing the magnitude of the loyalty program 
requirements, while holding the reward constant, can enhance the likelihood of 
joining the program (hereafter, the idiosyncratic fit hypothesis). 
 
 Although this hypothesis focuses on likelihood of joining the program as the primary 
indicator of program attractiveness, one might also examine the effect of idiosyncratic fit and 
requirement level on consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for membership in the program.  
Indeed, some existing LPs require consumers to pay a membership fee when joining the program 
(e.g., American Express Membership Rewards, CBS SportsLine Rewards Plus, and 
BLOCKBUSTER Rewards).  However, because most current programs do not charge membership 
fees, many consumers may resist paying even a small amount to join a LP.  In the subsequent tests 
of the idiosyncratic fit heuristic, we employ likelihood of joining as the main measure of program 
value and supplement it in Study 2 with a WTP membership fees measure and in Study 4 with a 
binary join/no join choice measure. 
 
METHOD OVERVIEW 
We conducted a series of studies to test the idiosyncratic fit hypothesis as well as the 
predictions discussed subsequently.  In these studies, the respondents were either recruited at 
domestic terminals of a major airport or at a large East Coast university.  The airport respondents 
were between 18 and 80 years old and represented a wide range of demographic characteristics.  
A total of approximately 2,300 respondents participated in the studies.  In all cases, respondents 
were randomly assigned to conditions. 
In each study, a written introduction explained the general concept of loyalty (or 
frequency) programs, using the example of frequent flyer programs, and asked respondents to 
make choices, indicate their likelihood of joining, and/or state their WTP fees for the described 
LPs.  The programs used in the studies were based on actual LPs available in the marketplace, 
such as department store, grocery store, and credit card programs.  The descriptions of the 
relevant LPs specified the program requirements (e.g., number of purchases needed to obtain the 
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 reward) and presented the reward/s in detail, including color photographs.  The rewards were also 
based on real LPs, such as a prepaid phone card, a car vacuum cleaner, and a movie ticket. 
The perceived idiosyncratic fit was manipulated by affecting either the individual effort 
or the perceived reference effort (see left- and right-hand side of Figure 1, respectively).  For 
example, the individual effort can be varied by informing respondents that a store that offers a 
LP is located either far away from or close to their house.  Alternatively, perceived idiosyncratic 
fit can be manipulated by changing the perceived reference effort.  For instance, providing 
respondents with an ostensibly “objective,” yet actuarially over- [under-] estimated number of 
shopping trips typically required for most consumers to reach a particular level of spending may 
lead respondents to perceive their own effort as relatively low [high].  Finally, in the last study, 
we used consumers’ pre-existing tastes to measure rather than manipulate the perception of 
idiosyncratic fit or misfit.  This study also elicited LP choices with real potential consequences. 
 
TESTS OF THE IMPACT OF IDIOSYNCRATIC FIT ON PREFERENCES FOR 
LOYALTY PROGRAMS 
Study 1:  Tests of the Idiosyncratic Fit Heuristic Using Manipulations of Individual Effort 
Method.  We tested the idiosyncratic fit hypothesis by measuring respondents’ likelihood 
of joining two programs, involving a gas station LP (329 airport travelers) and a department store 
LP (354 airport travelers).3  In both programs, respondents were randomly assigned to one of 
four conditions in a 2 (program requirements: low vs. high) x 2 (idiosyncratic fit: low vs. high) 
between-subjects design.  In both LPs, the perceived idiosyncratic fit was manipulated by 
varying the individual effort. 
In the gas station problem (see Figure 2a), respondents were told either that this gas 
station was close to their house and that they usually filled their tank there (low individual effort 
 high idiosyncratic fit) or that this gas station was located ten miles away from their house 
                                              
3 The two scenarios were run separately, but we include both under Study 1 because they used a similar methodology. 
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 (high individual effort  low idiosyncratic fit).  The level of program requirements was either 
ten gasoline purchases (low program requirements) or twenty gasoline purchases (high 
requirements).  In all conditions, the reward was a car vacuum cleaner.  Respondents were asked 
to rate the likelihood that they would join this program (relative to typical programs they are 
familiar with).  Ratings were made on an eleven-point scale ranging from “Very Unlikely to 
Join” (0) to “Very Likely to Join” (10). 
The manipulation of perceived idiosyncratic fit in the department store LP was similar to 
that used in the gas station program (see Figure 2b).  The program requirements involved 
accumulating either $1,500 or $3,000 of purchases at the department store (i.e., low versus high 
program requirements, respectively) and the reward was a Starbucks home espresso machine.  
Respondents were asked to rate the likelihood that they would join this program using the same 
eleven-point scale. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert figures 2a and 2b about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Results.  Consistent with the idiosyncratic fit hypothesis, the results of the gas station 
scenario indicate that the interaction between idiosyncratic fit and program requirements in 
determining the likelihood of joining the program was statistically significant and in the 
hypothesized direction (F = 4.7; df = 1; p < .05).  For respondents who were told that the station 
was close to their house, the joining likelihood was higher for those given a program requirement of 
twenty versus ten gasoline purchases (M = 6.1 vs. M = 4.7, t = 2.5; p < .01).  Further, as expected, 
for respondents who were told that the station was located 10 miles away from their house, the 
positive effect of program requirements on the likelihood of joining was eliminated (M = 3.1 in 
the low program requirements condition vs. M = 2.8 in the high program requirements condition; 
n.s.).  In addition, as would be expected, greater proximity to the gas station had a significant 
positive main effect on the likelihood of joining (M = 2.9 vs. M = 5.4; F = 40.2; df = 1; p < .001). 
 10
 Similar results were obtained in the department store problem, with the statistically 
significant interaction between idiosyncratic fit and program requirements (F = 5.3; df = 1; 
p < .05).  When respondents were told that the store was close to their house, increasing 
(between-subjects) the program requirements from $1,500 to $3,000 of purchases led to a 
significantly higher mean likelihood of joining the program (M = 4.4 vs. M = 5.4; t = 1.8; p < 
.05).  Further, as expected, when respondents were told that the store was located 20 miles away 
from their house, increasing the program requirements led to a marginally significantly lower 
likelihood of joining (M = 3.6 vs. M = 2.9; t = 1.5; p < .1).  And, as would be expected, greater 
proximity to the store had a significant positive main effect on the likelihood of joining (M = 3.3. 
vs. M = 4.9; F = 22.9; df = 1; p < .001). 
In summary, consistent with the idiosyncratic fit hypothesis, the results indicate that, 
when idiosyncratic fit was high (i.e., individual effort << reference effort), higher program 
requirements enhanced the likelihood of joining the program.  In addition, the positive effect of 
program requirements on joining likelihood was eliminated when idiosyncratic fit was low.  
These results support the notion that consumers employ an idiosyncratic fit heuristic when 
assessing loyalty programs and that such a heuristic can even lead to violations of dominance.  
However, in Study 1 we tested the effect of idiosyncratic fit using a manipulation of 
individual effort.  Although the findings were consistent with our analysis, it is not clear that 
respondents actually considered their relative fit with the program vis-à-vis typical others.  Thus, 
in Studies 2 and 3 we test the idiosyncratic fit hypothesis by manipulating the reference effort 
while holding the individual effort constant. 
Study 2:  A Test of the Idiosyncratic Fit Heuristic Using a Manipulation of Reference Effort 
 Method.  In Study 2, 346 airport travelers evaluated a grocery store LP (see Figure 3); 
they were told that a previous study conducted at the airport revealed that it typically takes 
consumers eight [or four] shopping trips to a grocery store to make $300 of purchases.  The 
respondents were then asked to indicate how many trips to their favorite grocery store it takes 
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 them to reach $300 of purchases.  Thus, the manipulation was intended to create the perception 
of idiosyncratic [mis]fit for respondents in the “typically eight [four] shopping trips” condition 
because, for them, it may take fewer [more] shopping trips to reach the same level of purchases 
(i.e., individual effort is lower [higher] than reference effort).  The program requirements 
involved accumulating either $900 or $1,500 of payments at the grocery store (i.e., low versus 
high program requirements, respectively), and the reward was an AT&T 100 Minute prepaid 
calling card.  There were two dependent variables: (a) a rating of the likelihood of joining the 
program, and (b) the highest amount of membership fees respondents were willing to pay in 
order to join the program. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert figure 3 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Manipulation Check.  Unlike the explicit manipulation of individual effort used in the 
previous study, the manipulation employed in this study was designed to influence the perceived 
reference effort.  Accordingly, we first examined whether the differences between the provided 
estimates of required trips for typical consumers (i.e., 4 or 8) and the respondents’ individual 
estimates were in the expected direction.  On average, respondents in the high reference effort 
condition (“typically takes most consumers eight shopping trips to reach $300 of payments”) 
indicated that it would take them 5.4 trips to accumulate $300-worth of purchases.  Similarly, for 
respondents in the low reference effort condition (“typically takes most consumers four shopping 
trips”), the mean estimated number of trips was 5.7.  Thus, the manipulation of reference effort 
produced the expected idiosyncratic [mis]fit conditions, with respondents in the high [low] 
reference effort condition indicating that it would take them significantly less [more] trips 
compared to the provided estimate for typical consumers (for both p < .001). 
Results.  Consistent with the idiosyncratic fit hypothesis, when respondents were told that 
it typically takes most consumers eight trips to the grocery store in order to reach the $300 
purchase level (i.e., high reference effort  high idiosyncratic fit), increasing the program 
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 requirements from $900 to $1,500 of payments at the grocery store led to a significantly higher 
mean likelihood of joining the program (M = 4.3 vs. M = 5.3, t = 1.7; p < .05).  Conversely, when 
respondents were told that it typically takes most consumers only four shopping trips to make 
$300 of payments (i.e., low reference effort  low idiosyncratic fit), the positive effect of 
program requirements was eliminated for likelihood of joining (M = 4.9 in the low program 
requirements condition vs. M = 4.5 in the high program requirements condition; n.s.).  An 
ANCOVA, using respondents’ self-estimated number of trips as a covariate, revealed that the 
interaction between idiosyncratic fit and program requirements on the likelihood of joining was 
statistically significant and in the hypothesized direction (F = 4.2; df = 1; p < .05).   
We also examined the results for the willingness-to-pay (WTP) membership fees, which 
were in the hypothesized direction: in the high idiosyncratic fit condition, greater program 
requirements led to a higher mean WTP (M = $3.5 vs. M = $9.8, t = 1.7; p < .05), whereas in the 
low idiosyncratic fit condition, greater requirements led to a lower mean WTP (M = $5.8 vs. 
M = $2.2, t = 1.7; p < .05).  In addition, greater idiosyncratic fit due to higher reference effort led 
to a marginally significant higher mean WTP (M = $4.1 vs. M = $6.6; F = 3.2; df = 1; p < .1).  
However, as one might expect, the WTP data revealed that more than half of the respondents 
indicated a zero WTP membership fees.  Thus, although the WTP results are consistent with our 
analysis, given that most current programs do not charge joining fees, WTP does not seem to be 
an effective measure of perceived program value. 
In summary, the results of the grocery store LP essentially replicate the pattern obtained 
in the gas station and department store LPs and provide further support for the notion that it is 
the perceived idiosyncratic [mis]fit that underlies the preferences for the LPs.  In particular, this 
study demonstrates that idiosyncratic fit can also be manipulated by varying the reference effort, 
while holding the individual effort constant.  This manipulation increased the salience of both the 
reference effort and the comparison between the reference and individual efforts.  Although such 
explicit comparisons are not uncommon in the marketplace (e.g., an ad might encourage 
consumers to make certain comparisons), an important question is whether consumers would 
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 spontaneously consider the gap between reference and individual effort (i.e., idiosyncratic fit) 
without being prompted to do so.  To address this issue, we conducted an additional test of the 
idiosyncratic fit hypothesis in Study 3 using an implicit manipulation of perceived reference 
effort.  Also, to gain further insight into the mechanism underlying the responses to LPs, we 
included in Study 3 a process measure to assess the perceived idiosyncratic fit. 
Study 3:  A Test of the Idiosyncratic Fit Heuristic Using an Implicit Manipulation of Reference Effort 
Perceptions of the implicit idiosyncratic fit of LPs might be influenced by selectively 
providing accelerated earning opportunities (or “effort discounts”), such as double miles or 
points that apply only to a sub-segment of consumers.  For instance, many current LPs provide 
“double-points” for purchases made at specific sites or “earn-partners,”4 or for members who are 
affiliated with some specific “ally program.”  One example is the American Express Membership 
Rewards® program that offers one point for every dollar of purchases using their credit card.  
This program has recently begun offering double-points for purchases made at several specific 
grocery or gasoline chains.  Further, AMEX mails this offer to members and includes 
information regarding the participating grocery and gasoline chains that happen to be located 
near the member’s home.  
With such limited offers, as the scope of earn-partners for double-points is reduced, for 
example, from all grocery chains to only one chain, consumers who receive double-points in 
both cases are likely to perceive their idiosyncratic fit as greater in the latter, more exclusive 
case.  That is, while their individual effort has not changed (they receive double-points for 
grocery purchases in both scenarios), the perceived reference effort may increase, because fewer 
program members would now qualify for the double-points.  Such a manipulation of reference 
effort does not explicitly mention the consumption habits or efforts of typical other consumers 
and thus does not create an explicit contrast between individual and reference effort. 
                                              
4  An “earn-partner” offers the sponsor's program currency (e.g., points or miles) as a reward to customers who buy 
the earn-partner’s products/services (Website Colloquy.Com). 
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 Method.  The respondents were 164 airport travelers.  Perceived idiosyncratic fit was 
manipulated by varying the perception of the reference effort.  Specifically, in the low 
idiosyncratic fit condition, respondents were told that a credit card LP (see Figure 4) offers 
double-points for every dollar spent at any grocery chain and at any gasoline chain (low 
reference effort  low idiosyncratic fit).  In the high idiosyncratic fit condition, on the other 
hand, respondents were told that the credit card LP offers double-points for every dollar spent at 
one particular grocery chain and at one particular gasoline chain, which happened to be where 
they regularly purchased groceries and gasoline (high reference effort  high idiosyncratic fit).  
Thus, while the individual effort was the same for respondents in both conditions (i.e., all 
respondents enjoyed the double-points offer), the reference effort was higher in the second case 
because fewer consumers in the general population would enjoy the double-points offer.  The 
level of program requirements was either accumulating 5,000 points or 10,000 points (i.e., low 
versus high program requirements), and the reward was a Compton’s encyclopedia CD-ROM.  
Respondents were asked to rate the likelihood that they would join the program. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert figure 4 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Next, respondents rated how hard or easy it would be for them to comply with the 
program’s requirements compared to most consumers.  The ratings were on a 1 (much harder for 
me) to 7 (much easier for me) effort dis/advantage scale, which served as a measure for 
perceived idiosyncratic fit.  This measure of perceived effort advantage was expected to be a 
function of the interaction between the level of program requirements and the idiosyncratic fit 
manipulation: in the high idiosyncratic fit condition, greater program requirements were 
expected to enhance respondents’ perception that the program was easier for them, and vice-
versa in the low idiosyncratic fit condition.  Finally, we expected that perceived effort advantage 
would mediate the interaction effect between program requirements and idiosyncratic fit 
condition on the likelihood of joining the program. 
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 Idiosyncratic fit manipulation check.  Consistent with the idiosyncratic fit manipulation, 
respondents in the high reference effort condition (i.e., high idiosyncratic fit) rated the program 
on average as easier for them compared to typical others than did respondents in the low 
reference effort condition (M = 4.4 vs. M = 3.8, t = 1.9; p < .05).  Thus, the manipulation of 
double-points for purchases made at “any” versus at the respondents’ “favorite” grocery and 
gasoline chains created the expected perception of idiosyncratic fit.  Moreover, an ANOVA 
revealed that the interaction between the idiosyncratic fit manipulation and the level of program 
requirements on the perceived effort advantage was statistically significant and in the expected 
direction (F = 4.4; df = 1; p < .05).  Specifically, in the high idiosyncratic fit condition, 
increasing the program requirements led respondents to perceive the program as easier to comply 
with compared to most other consumers (M = 4.2 vs. M = 4.7).  Conversely, in the low 
idiosyncratic fit condition, increasing the program requirements led respondents to perceive 
compliance with the program as harder for them compared to most others (M = 4.1 vs. M = 3.4).  
This result is consistent with the notion that the idiosyncratic fit manipulation affected the gap 
between individual and reference effort in the expected direction by shifting the perceived 
reference effort (see right-hand side of Figure 1). 
Results.  Consistent with the idiosyncratic fit hypothesis, an ANOVA revealed that the 
interaction between idiosyncratic fit (manipulated via reference effort) and program requirements 
on joining likelihood was statistically significant and in the hypothesized direction (F = 5.8; 
df = 1; p < .05).  When respondents were told that the double-points were offered for every dollar 
spent at the particular grocery chain and gasoline chain that they usually patronize (i.e., high 
reference effort  high idiosyncratic fit), increasing program requirements from 5,000 points to 
10,000 points led to a significant increase in the respondents’ reported likelihood of joining the 
program (M = 3.8 vs. M = 5.4, t = 2.2; p < .05).  By contrast, when respondents were told that 
double-points could be obtained at any grocery or gasoline chain (i.e., low reference effort  
low idiosyncratic fit), increasing program requirements led to a marginally significant decrease 
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 in the likelihood of joining the program (M = 3.1 vs. M = 2.2, t = 1.3; p < .1).  In addition, 
consistent with the idiosyncratic fit manipulation, across the two levels of program requirements, 
greater idiosyncratic fit led to a statistically significant higher likelihood of joining (M = 2.7 vs. 
M = 4.5; F = 13.2; df = 1; p < .001).   
A mediation analysis (Baron and Kenny 1986) indicated that the measure of perceived 
effort advantage mediated the interaction between idiosyncratic fit condition and program 
requirements on the likelihood of joining.  In particular, the following three conditions for 
mediation were supported: (1) the independent variables (i.e., requirement level x idiosyncratic fit 
condition) significantly affected the mediator (i.e., perceived effort advantage), as reported above; 
(2) the independent variables significantly affected the dependent variable (i.e., likelihood of 
joining the credit card LP), per the idiosyncratic fit hypothesis; and (3) the mediator affected the 
dependent variable (F = 61.0; df = 1; p < .001) when the independent variables were also included 
in the analysis, and thus, the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable was 
attenuated (F = 2.2; df = 1; p > .1).  These results support the mediating role of perceived 
idiosyncratic fit and the proposed underlying mechanisms for the observed LP preferences. 
In summary, the credit card test provides further support for the proposition that 
consumers (over)rely on an idiosyncratic fit heuristic when assessing the value of loyalty 
programs.  In particular, this study manipulated idiosyncratic fit by influencing the perception of 
the reference effort without explicitly evoking the typical other consumer or the contrast between 
individual and reference effort.  Even with this subtle manipulation, respondents perceived their 
effort advantage to be greater in the high idiosyncratic fit condition, and the effort advantage was 
further enhanced when the program requirements were increased.  The opposite pattern was 
observed for respondents in the low idiosyncratic fit condition.  Finally, the perception of the 
effort [dis]advantage (i.e., perceived idiosyncratic [mis]fit) mediated the effects on joining 
likelihood predicted by the idiosyncratic fit hypothesis. 
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 Study 4:  Spontaneous Use of the Idiosyncratic Fit Heuristic in Evaluations of a Loyalty Program 
So far, all of the tests of the idiosyncratic fit heuristic have involved a manipulation of fit.  
A question that naturally arises is whether consumers spontaneously consider their idiosyncratic 
fit (or lack of fit) with LPs, even when there are no explicit cues for (or manipulations of) such 
[mis]fit.  Accordingly, in this study, we investigate the idiosyncratic fit heuristic using an 
unobtrusive measurement of consumers’ pre-existing tastes (i.e., after consumers make their 
decision), rather than a manipulation of individual or reference effort.  Moreover, to allow for a 
particularly realistic test of the idiosyncratic fit heuristic, the participants in the present study 
were asked to make decisions with real potential consequences. 
This study also allows us to test an alternative explanation (hereafter, the “signaling” 
account) for the effect of program requirements on preference toward loyalty programs.  A great 
deal of research has shown that higher cost (e.g., higher price) sometimes signals higher quality 
or value (e.g., Zeithaml 1988).  Furthermore, it might be argued that the rewards used in Studies 
1-3 involved some value uncertainty.  It is, thus, possible that higher program requirements 
enhanced the perceived worth of rewards, which could account for the positive impact of higher 
LP requirements on joining likelihood.  This account cannot explain the interaction between 
program requirements and idiosyncratic fit and the finding that, in the low fit condition, greater 
requirements do not increase joining likelihood.  Moreover, in each scenario, we provided a 
detailed description and a color picture of the reward, which should reduce the uncertainty about 
the reward’s value.  Nevertheless, the present study directly examined the signaling account by 
(a) using rewards with well-known or specified value (e.g., a movie ticket), and (b) examining 
whether participants perceived the reward as more valuable when it was contingent on greater 
effort requirements. 
Method.  The participants were 195 students at a large East Coast university.  Participants 
were recruited at an on-campus food court.  There are multiple restaurants in this dining area, 
including a sushi bar and a sandwich shop.  Participants were informed that there was a plan 
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 under consideration to start a “frequent diner” program that would reward students for their 
patronage at the various dining locations on the university campus.  They were asked to complete 
a questionnaire that was described as part of an effort to determine the level of interest in such a 
program and whether it should be launched. 
Participants were randomly assigned to either a low or high program requirements 
condition.  All participants were told that they would be required to pay a one-time membership 
fee of $2 and carry a “Frequent Diner Card” that would be used for tracking their purchases.  In 
the low requirements condition, program participants would have to purchase twelve sandwiches 
at any on-campus dining location, whereas in the high requirements condition they would have 
to buy twelve sandwiches and twelve sushi meals.  In both conditions, participants who complete 
the required effort would earn a movie ticket (good at any local movie theater) and a $10 pre-
paid phone card (good for 100 minutes of domestic calls within the U.S.).  Figure 5 presents the 
“Frequent Diner Card” shown to participants in each condition. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert figure 5 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Participants were asked to indicate whether or not they would join the program.  
Participants were also asked to rate the likelihood that they would join this program on an 
eleven-point scale ranging from “Very Unlikely to Join this program” (-5) to “Very Likely to 
Join this program” (5).  Next, participants were given an additional page on which they were 
asked to rate how difficult or easy it would be for them, compared to typical other students, to 
complete (A) twelve sushi purchases at on-campus restaurants; and (B) twelve sandwich 
purchases at on-campus restaurants.  The ratings were on a seven-point scale ranging from 
“Much more difficult for me than for typical students” (1) to “Much easier for me than for 
typical students” (7).  In addition, to test the signaling account, a sub-sample of participants were 
asked to indicate how much they thought one movie ticket (good at any movie theater in the 
local city) typically costs. 
The perceived effort advantage in completing twelve sushi purchases served as the 
 19
 measure of perceived idiosyncratic fit.  Recall that the only difference between the low and high 
requirement conditions was that the latter required twelve additional sushi purchases.  Thus, for 
participants who found it easy (relative to others) to complete sushi purchases, the high 
requirements condition was expected to enhance the perception of fit relative to the low 
requirement condition, which did not require buying sushi.  Conversely, participants for whom 
the sushi requirement was relatively difficult were expected to perceive the high requirements 
program as providing an idiosyncratic misfit.  We intentionally selected sandwich and sushi 
purchases as the program requirements, because the appeal of sandwiches was expected to be 
more universal, whereas the preference toward sushi was likely to be segmented, with some 
students craving sushi and others disliking it.  Further, it is reasonable to assume that most 
students probably knew that the appeal of sushi tended to be segmented and the appeal of 
sandwiches was more universal, which was expected to enhance the perception of idiosyncratic 
[mis]fit with the high requirements program for individuals that crave [dislike] sushi. 
Figure 6 summarizes graphically the study’s design and the (expected) effect of program 
requirements on perceived idiosyncratic fit and misfit (using the framework presented in Figure 
1).  In the low requirements condition (i.e., 12 sandwich purchases), we expected that participants 
would perceive their individual effort in complying with the program to be similar to the reference 
effort of typical others, regardless of whether or not these participants liked sushi.  In the high 
requirements condition (i.e., 12 sandwich + 12 sushi purchases), we expected that those who liked 
sushi (“sushi lovers”) would perceive their individual compliance effort as lower than that of (the 
reference) typical students, thus providing them with an idiosyncratic fit.  Conversely, those who 
disliked sushi (“sushi haters”) were expected to perceive their individual effort in complying with 
the high requirements as greater than the reference effort (i.e., idiosyncratic misfit). 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert figure 6 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Results.  Participants were divided into two groups, “sushi haters” and “sushi lovers,” 
based on a median split of their reported effort dis/advantage in completing twelve sushi 
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 purchases (means and standard deviations of relative sushi ease ratings in the “sushi haters” and 
“sushi lovers” groups were 1.7 [s.d. = .85] and 4.9 [s.d. = .90], respectively).  These two groups 
represent the two levels of (measured) idiosyncratic fit.  We then used logistic regression to test 
the idiosyncratic fit hypothesis, which predicts that higher program requirements will enhance 
[decrease] the tendency to join the program for sushi lovers [haters].  The dependent variable 
received a value of 1 if the participant decided to join and 0 otherwise.  The independent 
variables included the program requirements condition (12 sandwich purchases vs. 12 sandwich 
+ 12 sushi items), the idiosyncratic fit level, and the interaction between the requirement 
condition and the idiosyncratic fit level. 
As predicted by the idiosyncratic fit hypothesis, the interaction between the measured 
idiosyncratic fit and the program requirements was statistically significant and in the 
hypothesized direction (wald-2 = 22.0; p < .001).  Among participants with perceived 
idiosyncratic fit (“sushi lovers”), increasing the program requirements from 12 sandwich 
purchases to 12 sandwich + 12 sushi purchases led to a marginally significant higher share of 
participants who chose to join the program (58% vs. 73%; t = 1.5; p < .1).  Conversely, as 
expected, among participants with perceived idiosyncratic misfit (“sushi haters”), increasing the 
requirements led to a significantly lower rate of joining the program (82% vs. 29%; t = 6.5; p < 
.001).  We obtained similar results when, instead of a median-split, we used in the logistic 
regression analysis the continuous measure of sushi effort dis/advantage (p < .001). 
 The pattern of results is also similar if the eleven-point joining likelihood is used as the 
dependent variable.  In particular, consistent with the idiosyncratic fit hypothesis, there was a 
statistically significant interaction between the measured groups of idiosyncratic fit and the 
program requirements (F = 27.0; df = 1; p < .001).  Among participants with perceived 
idiosyncratic fit (“sushi lovers”), greater program requirements led to a significantly higher rated 
likelihood of joining (M = 0.6 vs. M = 2.0; t = 1.9; p < .05), whereas among participants with 
perceived idiosyncratic misfit (“sushi haters”), greater requirements led to a significantly lower 
likelihood of joining (M = 1.9 vs. M = -1.4; t = 5.5; p < .001).  Again, we obtained similar results 
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 using the continuous measure of sushi effort dis/advantage (p < .001). 
 Because the perception of idiosyncratic fit was measured rather than manipulated, there 
exists a risk of confounding effects due to unobservable differences between the two groups.  In 
particular, “sushi lovers” and “sushi haters” might differ with respect to their preference toward 
sandwiches.  However, we did not find such a difference - the mean sandwich effort 
dis/advantage rating for “sushi haters” was 4.0 on the 1-7 scale [s.d. = 1.9] and 4.2 for “sushi 
lovers” [s.d. = 1.8].  Accordingly, the inclusion of the sandwich effort dis/advantage measure as 
a covariate in the model did not attenuate the statistical significance of the interaction between 
requirement level and measured idiosyncratic fit.  Finally, participants in the high requirement 
conditions did not estimate a higher cost for one movie ticket than participants in the low 
requirement condition (M = $9.8 vs. M = $9.7; t = .9; p > .1), which is inconsistent with the 
signaling account. 
 In summary, the frequent diner study demonstrated the impact of the idiosyncratic fit 
heuristic using an unobtrusive measure of idiosyncratic fit, in the context of an actual loyalty 
program with real potential consequences.  Consistent with the earlier results, participants with 
idiosyncratic fit (“sushi lovers”) were more likely to prefer a dominated program that required 
them to purchase 12 sandwiches as well as 12 sushi orders.  Finally, the fact that these results 
were obtained with rewards that have well-defined and familiar values provides evidence that 
signaling cannot explain the obtained pattern of results.  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 Customer relationship management (CRM) and one-to-one marketing have been widely 
adopted by companies and have received a great deal of attention from marketers, consultants, 
and, to a lesser degree, academics.  An important goal of such marketing strategies is the 
development of customer loyalty, often employing loyalty programs.  In this article, we propose 
that a key factor contributing to the success or failure of LPs at the individual level is idiosyncratic 
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 fit, namely the perceived relative advantage that a program provides to an individual customer.  In 
this section, we discuss the theoretical and practical implications of the present findings. 
Key Findings and Theoretical Implications 
 Review of Key Findings.  We proposed that consumers employ an idiosyncratic fit 
heuristic, whereby the dis/advantage of a consumer relative to a reference effort (e.g., the effort 
for most other consumers) is used as a cue for assessing the attractiveness of a LP and 
contributes to the overall perceived value of that program.  Similar to other heuristics, although 
using it is often reasonable and helpful, over-applying it can lead to biases and counter-
normative decision-making (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982).  In particular, we 
hypothesized that, under perceived idiosyncratic fit, increasing the effort requirement of a LP can 
enhance the perceived advantage of the consumer and thus the attractiveness of the program.  
This prediction was supported in a series of studies employing different methodologies. 
 In Study 1, the idiosyncratic fit manipulation involved changing the consumer’s 
individual effort (e.g., the distance from the department store).  This study left open the 
possibility that consumers evaluate programs solely on the basis of their own individual effort 
and not in relation to the reference effort of typical others.  Study 2 (grocery store LP) addressed 
this limitation using a manipulation of idiosyncratic fit that varied the perceived reference effort 
of typical others.  This was accomplished by informing respondents about the consumption rate 
of groceries (i.e., high vs. low) of typical consumers.  Still, the study involved a rather salient 
and explicit manipulation of reference effort, which may not reflect typical consumer decisions 
in the marketplace. 
Accordingly, Study 3 (credit card LP) employed an implicit and more subtle 
manipulation of the perceived reference effort and idiosyncratic fit, using a double-points offer to 
either a narrow or a broad segment of consumers.  Again, under perceived idiosyncratic fit (i.e., 
the offer is limited to a narrow segment that includes the consumer), greater requirements 
increased the likelihood of joining the program. 
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 The final study (frequent diner program) allowed for a particularly strong test of the 
idiosyncratic fit heuristic, using decisions with real potential consequences and an unobtrusive, 
post-decision measurement (rather than manipulation) of fit.  The study demonstrated that 
consumers, for whom a particular effort requirement (purchasing sushi) was easy relative to 
others, were more likely to join a dominated program that included the easier effort as an added 
requirement.  These results suggest that consumers often spontaneously (over)employ the 
idiosyncratic fit heuristic, even without being prompted to do so.  In particular, a consumer’s 
perception of fit is likely to play a role in determining preferences if the consumer perceives that 
fit as unique relative to most others. 
The Role of the Idiosyncratic Fit Heuristic in Judgment and Decision-Making.  The 
notion of idiosyncratic fit is related to research on the impact of others’ welfare or satisfaction on 
one’s own preferences in contexts such as negotiation (Corfman and Lehmann 1993; 
Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman 1989), competition (Lehmann 2001), game theory (e.g., 
Feinberg, Krishna, and Zhang 2002; Rabin 1993), and equity and justice (e.g., Lind and Tyler 
1988; Adams 1965; Messick and Cooke 1983).  For example, Feinberg, Krishna, and Zhang 
(2002) recently demonstrated that consumers are affected not only by prices they themselves are 
offered, but also by prices available to others, which has implications for the design of targeted 
promotions.  And, in a different domain, Bazerman et al. (1992) showed that people often 
evaluate their outcomes (e.g., a salary raise) based on a comparison with others, rather than 
based on absolute values.  Relatedly, some authors have suggested that the sensitivity of 
satisfaction to the consumption and income level relative to others, rather than to absolute levels, 
has led the majority of working Americans to overwork and experience leisure as an 
unaffordable luxury (Schor 1991; see also Frank 1985; Kivetz and Simonson 2002b). 
Support for the notion that preferences are sensitive to the outcomes of others is also 
found in research on interpersonal attraction.  Specifically, Walster et al. (1973) found two 
factors that contributed to a woman’s desirability (i.e., according to male subjects): (1) how 
“hard to get” she was for the subject, and (2) how hard to get she was for other men.  Subjects 
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 were significantly more likely to prefer to date a selectively hard to get woman (i.e., a woman 
that was easy for the subject to get but hard for all other men to get) over both a uniformly hard 
to get woman and a uniformly easy to get woman.  Although Walster et al. (1973) did not 
explain their results using the notion of idiosyncratic fit (but rather based on social desirability 
considerations), their findings are consistent with this principle and with the pattern of 
preferences toward loyalty programs observed in the present research. 
We believe that the idiosyncratic fit heuristic plays a role in many other domains, 
including consumer responses to different promotional and product offers.  In particular, 
consumers may overweigh aspects that, although relatively less significant in absolute terms, 
happen to fit their idiosyncratic and possibly unconventional preferences.  Similarly, consumers 
might avoid options that fit the preferences of others better.  This tendency can account for 
previous findings indicating that consumers tend to reject options that include costless and 
unneeded optional features (Simonson et al. 1994) and options that are selected by other 
consumers for personally irrelevant reasons (Simonson et al. 1993).  Future research could 
examine factors that moderate the weight of idiosyncratic fit in judgment and decision making, 
such as context and task characteristics (e.g., type of consumption, cognitive and/or motivational 
resources), individual differences (e.g., demographics, need for achievement, sensitivity to social 
comparisons, need for cognition), and cultural norms. 
For example, although we did not a priori expect gender to moderate the impact of 
idiosyncratic fit, we did record the respondents’ gender in Studies 1 and 4 reported above.  In 
both studies the results indicated that the influence of idiosyncratic fit was particularly 
pronounced among women (see Table 1).  For example, in Study 4, female students who rated 
purchasing sushi as easier for them than for other students (i.e., high idiosyncratic fit 
respondents) were more likely to join the program under high as opposed to low requirements 
(71% vs. 47%; t = 1.6; p < .1).  Conversely, the effect of (high) idiosyncratic fit on men was in 
the expected direction but did not approach statistical significance (75% vs. 65%; t = 0.7; p > .2).  
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 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Although these tentative findings need to be replicated and investigated further in future 
research, the apparent gender effect is consistent with a growing body of research regarding the 
role of the interdependent- versus the independent-self for women compared to men.  This 
research suggests that U.S. women tend to maintain an interdependent self-construal, whereby 
self-definition is related to others, whereas U.S. men tend to maintain an independent self, 
whereby self-definition is based on one’s unique attributes (e.g., Markus and Oyserman 1989).  
Relatedly, women’s judgement of their likely performance on tasks (self-evaluations) has been 
found to be sensitive to their partner’s ability, while men’s judgments are not (Lenney, Gold, and 
Browning 1983).  The notions that females engage in more elaborate and motivated social 
perception and that they tend to be more interdependent and attentive to information concerning 
others (for reviews see Cross and Madson 1997; Meyers-Levy 1989) suggests that they will 
weigh more heavily in their decisions the fit of a program for them relative to others. 
Another potentially important moderator of the impact of idiosyncratic fit is the notion 
that this and possibly other heuristics are more effective when they are incidental, self-generated, 
and/or occur spontaneously, without being triggered or highlighted by the seller (for a related 
discussion, see Friestad and Wright 1994).  Specifically, we posit that consumers will weigh 
their idiosyncratic fit with LPs or other marketing promotions more heavily when they perceive 
this fit as incidental rather than deliberately designed by the marketer.  This effect is likely to be 
asymmetric – the perception of idiosyncratic misfit may be especially damaging (i.e., decrease 
the option’s perceived attractiveness) when it is construed as intentional as opposed to incidental.  
The effects of premeditated versus incidental fit on consumer preference and the related 
underlying mechanisms merit further research. 
Although we have focused on the impact of idiosyncratic fit on consumer choice, the use 
of this heuristic may also have important consequences for post-decisional satisfaction.  In 
particular, consumers may be more satisfied with the outcome of their choices and with products 
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 and services when they have relied on idiosyncratic fit in making their purchase decisions, even 
though they may have (unknowingly) violated value maximization.  Future research can examine 
the notion that idiosyncratic fit enhances not only decision utility, but also experience, 
consumption, and/or remembered utility (e.g., Hsee 1999; Kahneman 1999; Kahneman and 
Varey 1991). 
Practical Implications 
 Beyond the theoretical significance of the idiosyncratic fit heuristic, it has important 
practical implications for loyalty programs, CRM, one-to-one marketing, and other promotional 
tactics and offers that are designed for individual customers.  According to the one-to-one 
marketing approach (Peppers and Rogers 1993), companies should strive to establish learning 
relationships with individual customers and then use what they have learned to design 
customized offers, thus enhancing customer loyalty.  However, the present research suggests that 
understanding the relative fit of individual customers to specific offers and options may often be 
more important than measuring their “absolute” preferences, which are often fuzzy and unstable.  
That is, a one-to-one marketer may not gain a significant competitive advantage if the offer made 
fits the preferences and unique conditions of the particular customer no better than the 
preferences and conditions of other customers.  Conversely, offers that provide idiosyncratic fit, 
even if that fit relates to a less important dimension, can have a significant impact on customer 
evaluations and loyalty. 
The findings also indicate that marketers can increase participation in LPs by designing 
programs that foster the perception of fit (i.e., without appearing deliberate; see earlier 
discussion).  The perception of idiosyncratic fit can be enhanced by highlighting, for example, 
(a) the proximity of a store offering a LP to the customer; (b) the higher purchase frequency of 
the customer relative to others; and (c) the perceived exclusiveness of a double-points offer (e.g., 
by suggesting close establishments where double-points can be earned or by limiting the offer to 
a specific town).  The growing availability of information about consumers and business 
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 customers makes such idiosyncratic fit based strategies more feasible than before (see, e.g., 
Blattberg and Deighton 1991). 
Furthermore, by creating or emphasizing the perception of idiosyncratic fit programs can 
require more effort for a relatively small enhancement of the reward.  That is, idiosyncratic fit 
based strategies can enable marketers to decrease the program’s funding rate (the reward-to-
effort ratio), without a significant drop in participation rates.  In essence, idiosyncratic fit lowers 
the “effort elasticity of participation.”  Although existing LPs do not permit a rigorous test of this 
implication, there are indications that highly loyal members, who are likely to perceive 
themselves as having an idiosyncratic fit with the program, are greatly motivated by programs 
with very high requirement levels (e.g., Colloquy 1997; Rose 1988).  
It is important to note that competition may eliminate the ability to reduce the funding 
rate without considerable consumer reactance.  For instance, consumers who make direct 
comparisons between programs that have substantially different funding rates are likely to prefer 
the more generous program.  However, the decision facing consumers is typically not which of 
two or more LPs to choose, but whether to enroll in a particular program.  Furthermore, 
marketers often make it difficult to compare between programs by using different denominations 
of effort (e.g., points, miles, dollars spent, or number of purchases) and/or by using different 
dollar-to-point conversion rates (e.g., 1 point/$1 spent, 10 points/$1 spent, or 1 point/$10 spent).  
Indeed, as Kivetz and Simonson (2000) note, by representing attribute levels with different labels 
or scales, marketers might be able to discourage consumers from making certain within attribute 
comparisons that do not favor their offering. 
Nevertheless, in industries in which comparable LPs exists, de facto standards might 
emerge regarding the denomination of effort and the appropriate funding rate.  For example, in 
the airline industry, “miles” are the standard scale for efforts, and most frequent flyer programs 
require approximately 25,000 miles for a free roundtrip domestic ticket.  Thus, a program that 
increases this requirement to 50,000 miles is unlikely to attract many members.  However, even 
in the airline industry, we are starting to see programs that offer non-flight rewards and/or 
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 require accumulating points (e.g., Alaska Airlines) or flight-segments (e.g., Southwest Airlines) 
instead of miles (Lisser 1995).  These innovations can help firms lower the funding rate without 
triggering a consumer backlash. 
Finally, using the idiosyncratic fit heuristic to influence customers’ decisions may appear 
unethical.  However, just as marketers employ differentiation and versioning strategies that are 
intended to extract consumer surplus, a calculated use of the idiosyncratic fit heuristic can be 
regarded as a legitimate means for promoting loyalty programs and other products and services.  
At the same time, it is important to educate consumers about the disadvantages of over-relying 
on the valuations, tastes, and outcomes of others when making decisions.  This recommendation 
is also made in the Talmud, which asks, “Who is rich?” and answers, “He who is happy with his 
share.”  Indeed, although following this guideline may be difficult, people can make better 
choices by avoiding comparisons with the costs and benefits of others. 
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 FIGURE 2A 5 
GAS STATION FREQUENCY PROGRAM  
 
 
Frequent Gas Station Customer 
Imagine that your favorite, local gas station offers a loyalty reward program.   This gas station is 
close to your house and usually you fill your tank there anyway.   [This gas station is located 10 
miles away from your house.]  According to this program, after you purchase gasoline at the gas 











Likelihood of joining the program (0-10)___ 
 
 
Car Vacuum Cleaner 
 Cleans both dry and wet areas 
 Compact, light, & easy to use 
 Comes with a coil cord that plugs 
into the cigarette lighter 
 Includes a brush attachment to scrub 
rugs and to loosen dried mud 
 Also includes a crevice tool for hard to reach areas 





Department Store Frequency Pr
Imagine that your favorite department store offers a 
frequency reward program.   This department store  
is close to your house and you shop there regularly.    
[This department store is located 20 miles away from  
your house.]  According to this program, after you  
accumulate $1,500 [3,000] of purchases at the  
department store, you will earn a Starbucks Barista™  
home espresso machine complete with all the  
accessories and a dozen convenient Pod espresso  
packs (shown to the right). 
Likelihood of joining the program (0-10)___ 
                                              
5 The introductions to both scenarios informed respondents that they will 
the program relative to typical programs they are familiar with, using an e
unlikely to join” (0) to “very likely to join” (10). 
 32Y PROGRAM 
ogram be asked to rate their likelihood of joining 
leven-point scale ranging from “very 
 FIGURE 3 
GROCERY STORE FREQUENCY PROGRAM 
 
Grocery Store Frequency Program 
Before you consider the grocery store program described below, please review the following data 
which we have collected in a previous study.   The purpose of this information is to help you 
make a more informed decision.   According to previous research we have conducted here at the 
airport and at Stanford, in eight [four] shopping trips to a grocery store (such as Safeway), 
consumers typically make $300 of purchases. 
1.  How many trips to your favorite grocery store does it take you to reach $300 of purchases: ______. 
 
Now, imagine that your favorite local grocery store offers the frequency program below: 
After you accumulate $900 [$1,500] of payments at the grocery store, you will earn an  
AT&T 100 Minute prepaid calling card. 
2.   How likely would you be to join this grocery store program? 
Please answer by entering a number between 0 (Very Unlikely  
to join) and 10 (Very Likely to join):    (0-10) _______ 
3.   What is the maximum amount of money that you are willing to pay in order to participate in 





CREDIT CARD FREQUENCY PROGRAM 
 
Credit Card Frequency Reward Program 
Imagine that your credit card company offers a reward program where you earn 1 point for every 
dollar you charge on any of the company’s cards.   The program also offers double points for 
every dollar spent using the company’s credit cards at one particular grocery chain and at one 
particular gasoline chain.   These particular grocery and gasoline chains happen to be your 
favorite chains where you purchase groceries and gasoline regularly.   [The program also offers 
double points for every dollar spent using the company’s credit cards at any grocery chain and at 
any gasoline chain.] 
According to the credit card reward program, after you accumulate 5,000 [10,000] points, you 
will earn a Compton’s Encyclopedia™ 2000 Deluxe CD-ROM (includes thousands of articles, 
photos, videos, maps, charts, and sound clips; made by The Learning Comp ny). 
 
1.   How likely would you be to join this program?   
  Please enter a number from 0 (Very unlikely to join)  
  to 10 (Very likely to join): _______. 
2.   How easy do you think it would be for you to accumulate the  
required 5,000 [10,000] points compared to most typical consumers? 
(circle the appropriate number) 
Much harder for me than for 
most typical consumers 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Much ea
most 
 
 34asier for me than for 
typical consumers 
 FIGURE 5 
FREQUENT DINER PROGRAM CARD 



















FREQUENT DINER PROGRAM 
After you buy twelve sandwiches (at any on-campus dining location), you will earn both one free 
movie ticket (good at any movie theater in [The City]) AND a $10 pre-paid phone card (good for 
100 minutes of domestic calls within the U.S.). 












After you buy both twelv
you will earn both one fre
paid phone card (good fo








 low ---  
 
 
Dining  Plus 
 
BUY 12 SANDWICHES AT ANY [UNIVERSITY] 
RESTAURANT AND EARN BOTH ONE MOVIE 
TICKET AND A $10 PRE-PAID PHONE CARD 
 




e sandwiches AND twelve sushi meals (at any on-campus dining location), 
e movie ticket (good at any movie theater in [The City]) AND a $10 pre-
r 100 minutes of domestic calls within the U.S.). 
low ---  
Dining  Plus 
 
BUY BOTH 12 SANDWICHES AND 12 SUSHI MEALS 
AT ANY [UNIVERSITY] RESTAURANT AND EARN 
BOTH ONE MOVIE TICKET AND A $10 PRE-PAID 
PHONE CARD 
One stamp per visit, per customer 
 
 FIGURE 6 




High Individual Effort 
(“sushi haters”) 
Low Individual Effort 
(“sushi lovers”) 
High requirements 
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